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1 
DEFRAGMENTING INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW TO 
PROTECT CITIZEN-CONSUMERS: 
THE ROLE OF AMICI CURIAE AND PUBLIC INTEREST GROUPS 
 ABSTRACT 
Investment arbitration decisions are often inconsistent. In particular, complaints 
about the unpredictability of NAFTA Chapter 11 jurisprudence and the 
difficulties  in  balancing  foreign  investors’  interest  and  public  policy are common 
and unresolved. An examination of the role of interest groups may shed important 
light on the resolution of that problem as they are involved in the social 
construction of the meaning and use of NAFTA Chapter 11 through arbitration 
and public debate. This work discusses the extent to which amici curiae empower 
public interest groups that seek to protect citizen-consumers. It argues that 
currently amici curiae provides an extremely narrow list of participation rights to 
public interest groups that, coupled with economic and political disadvantages in 
many cases, result in censoring the views of such groups and playing the political 
role of symbolic accountability. This work proposes an expansive view of amici
curiae for public interest groups in light of the potential of the latter to counter the 
influence corporate interest groups and to contribute to both minimize NAFTA 
Chapter 11 inconsistencies and strike a more realistic balance between the public 
interest   and   foreign   investors’   interest. The overall impact of such expansive 
amici curiae will probably be the defragmentation of NAFTA Chapter 11, that is 
to say, public interest groups will be empowered to introduce public interest 
considerations such as human rights, environmental protection and public health 
into NAFTA analysis, that are likely to protect the interest of local citizen-
consumers. However, that requires not only greater legal powers for public 
interest groups, but also favorable financial and political conditions for an 
effective participation of public interest groups in NAFTA disputes. The 
argument is illustrated with a brief discussion of amici curiae in the context of 
anti-smoking groups and tobacco policies in Canada affecting particularly 
vulnerable groups with high rates of tobacco consumption such as aboriginal 
communities and low-income groups. 
INTRODUCTION 
There is a growing concern about the inconsistencies of investment arbitration decisions 
in the context of economic globalization. NAFTA Chapter 11 jurisprudence is not an 
exception. After almost 20 years of NAFTA, the loopholes and uncertainties associated 
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with the interpretation of, for example, the regulatory expropriation provisions have 
grown despite the multiple calls for consistency and legitimacy. The resolution of the 
inconsistencies and unpredictability associated with the application of NAFTA Chapter 
11   and   the   difficulties   in   balancing   foreign   investors’   interest and public policy is, 
however, not to be found solely in a self-referential reinterpretation of NAFTA 
provisions. Placing NAFTA Chapter 11 in context is likely to shed more light into 
finding solutions to the problems of legal inconsistencies and lack of proper balancing 
between trade and the public interest. Embedding NAFTA Chapter 11 provisions in the 
broader institutional environment suggests the need for recognizing, inter alia, the role of 
interest groups in the social construction of the meaning and use of NAFTA provisions 
through arbitration and public debate. For instance, the idea of public purpose and 
proportionality of a measure can be socially constructed and interest groups can develop 
several regulatory expropriation discourses to suit their interests, which may ultimately 
influence investment tribunals and regulatory decisions by governments and shape public 
opinion about the ideas of legitimate policies. 
An interest group approach to NAFTA Chapter 11 analysis reveals the presence of 
competing interest groups in the development of investment arbitration. Corporate and 
public interest groups are central actors in such a process. In particular, given the 
influential role of corporate groups, an assessment of the ability of public interest groups 
to balance the influence of foreign investors in the context of NAFTA Chapter 11 appears 
to be critical. While the development and role of public interest groups depend on 
multiple social, economic and political factors, NAFTA rules can help promote a 
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significant role of such groups and then contribute to a better balancing of the interest of 
foreign investors and the public. Specifically, non-disputing party participation rights or 
amici curiae are an important institution that mediates in the competition of multiple 
interest groups that seek to influence the meaning and use of NAFTA Chapter 11. 
This work discusses the extent to which amici curiae empower public interest groups that 
seek to protect citizen-consumers. It argues that currently amici curiae provide an 
extremely narrow list of participation rights to public interest groups that, coupled with 
economic and political disadvantages in many cases, result in both censoring the views of 
such groups and playing the political role of symbolic accountability. This work proposes 
an expansive view of amici curiae for public interest groups in light of the potential of 
the latter to counter the influence corporate interest groups and to contribute to both 
minimize NAFTA Chapter 11 inconsistencies and strike a more realistic balance between 
the  public   interest  and  foreign   investors’   interest.  The  overall   impact  of  such  expansive  
amici curiae will probably be the defragmentation of NAFTA Chapter 11, that is to say, 
public interest groups will be empowered to introduce public interest considerations such 
as human rights, environmental protection and public health into NAFTA analysis that 
are likely to protect the interest of local citizen-consumers. However, that requires not 
only greater legal powers for public interest groups, but also favorable financial and 
political conditions for an effective participation of public interest groups in NAFTA 
disputes. The argument is illustrated with a brief discussion of amici curiae in the context 
of anti-smoking groups and tobacco policies in Canada affecting particularly vulnerable 
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groups with high rates of tobacco consumption such as aboriginal communities and low-
income groups. 
This article is organized as follows. It first reviews the current state of amici curiae under 
NAFTA and raises concerns about the limited participation rights that are accorded to 
public interest groups. The next section argues that an expansive view of amici curiae for 
public interest groups is warranted in light of its advantages for minimizing the 
inconsistencies of NAFTA Chapter 11 and better  balancing  foreign  investors’ interest and 
public policy. The last section discusses the example of anti-smoking groups in Canada 
and the relevance of an expansive view of amici curiae particularly for public interest 
groups seeking to protect vulnerable groups with high rates of tobacco consumption. 
AMICI CURIAE AND THE LIMITED LEGAL POWER OF PUBLIC INTEREST 
GROUPS 
Participation rights for non-disputing parties are one important mechanism that can 
encourage a greater role of public interest groups. This may entail a redesign of the 
NAFTA rules of the amici curiae institution. In Methanex Corp. v. United States, a 2001 
decision on amicus curiae,1 a tribunal proclaimed its powers to accept amicus 
submissions in investment arbitration for the first time2 on the basis of its interpretation 
1 Methanex Corp. v. United States, Decision of the Tribunal on Petitions from Third Persons to Intervene as 
“Amici   Curiae”   (NAFTA   Arb.,   Jan.   15,   2001),  
http://www.naftaclaims.com/Disputes/USA/Methanex/MethanexDecisionReAuthorityAmicus.pdf 
[hereinafter Methanex, Amici Curiae Decision] 
2 Other NAFTA tribunals have also allowed amicus curiae in arbitration. See United Parcel Serv. of Am.,
Inc. v. Canada, Decision on Petitions for Intervention and Participation as Amici Curiae, (NAFTA Arb. 
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of article 15(1) of the UNCITRAL Rules, which is substantially similar to Article 44 of 
the ICSID Convention3. According to the 2003 Statement of the Free Trade Commission
on Non-disputing Party Participation, the NAFTA agreement does not limit “a 
Tribunal’s  discretion  to  accept  written  submissions  from  a  person  or  entity  that   is  not  a 
disputing   party   (a   “non-disputing   party”)”4. In the Statement, the FTC recommends 
Tribunals to adopt a number of procedural rules concerning non-disputing party 
participation. While this is an important progress in the right direction, several of such 
recommendations restrict the ability of non-disputing parties to exert a significant 
influence on arbitration decisions and public debate more generally. These restrictions to 
the submissions of amici curiae include a short page limit, no obligation on the Tribunal 
to consider that submission, lack of permission for further submissions and no access to 
documents: 
3. The submission filed by a non-disputing party will:
 (b) be concise, and in no case longer than 20 typed pages, including any 
appendices; 
… 
9. The granting of leave to file a non-disputing party submission does not require
the Tribunal to address that submission at any point in the arbitration. The 
granting of leave to file a non-disputing party submission does not entitle the non-
disputing party that filed the submission to make further submissions in the 
arbitration. 
2001), paras.  63,  64,  66  (“…articles 1128 and 1133 of NAFTA do not preclude the existence of a power 
under article 15(1) [of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules] to allow a third party to make amicus 
submissions.  …”) and  73  (“The  Tribunal  declares  that  it  has  power  to accept written amicus briefs from the 
Petitioners”),  
http://www.naftaclaims.com/Disputes/Canada/UPS/UPSDecisionReParticipationAmiciCuriae.pdf.; Glamis
Gold Ltd. v. United States, Decision on Application and Submission by Quechan Indian Nation, (NAFTA 
Arb., September 16, 2005), pars. 13, http://www.naftaclaims.com/Disputes/USA/Glamis/Glamis-Amicus-
Decision--16-09-05.pdf 
3 Aguas Argentinas, S.A., Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona, S.A., and Vivendi Universal S.A. 
v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, Order in Response to a Petition for Transparency and
Participation as Amicus Curiae (May 19, 2005), para. 14 (noting that similarity), 
http://juris.prod.advomatic.com/files/free_pdfs/Suez%20v%20Argentina%20-Response%20Amicus.pdf. 
4 Statement of the Free Trade Commission on Non-disputing Party Participation
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10. Access to documents by non-disputing parties that file applications under
these  procedures  will  be  governed  by  the  FTC’s  Note  of  July  31,  2001.5 
It is also important to note that in Methanex Corp. v. United States, Decision on amicus
curiae,6 the tribunal, while admitting non-disputing parties7, rejected their request to 
attend oral hearings of the arbitration.8 Non-NAFTA tribunals have also rejected requests 
to attend oral hearings.9 Likewise, the Methanex tribunal  also  indicated  that  “[a]s    amici 
have no rights under Chapter 11 of NAFTA to receive any materials generated within the 
arbitration (or indeed any rights at all), they are to be treated by the Tribunal as any other 
members  of  the  public.”10 More generally, the tribunal stated that: 
… in   the  Tribunal’s  view, its receipt of written submissions from a person other
than the Disputing Parties is not equivalent to adding that person as a party to the 
arbitration. The rights of the Disputing Parties in the arbitration and the limited 
rights of a Non-Disputing Party under Article 1128 of NAFTA are not thereby 
acquired by such a third person. Their rights, both procedural and substantive, 
remain juridically exactly the same before and after receipt of such submissions; 
and the third person acquires no rights at all. The legal nature of the arbitration 
remains wholly unchanged.11 
5 Statement of the Free Trade Commission on Non-disputing Party Participation.
6 Methanex Corp. v. United States, Decision of the Tribunal on Petitions from Third Persons to Intervene as 
“Amici   Curiae”   (NAFTA   Arb.,   Jan.   15,   2001),  
http://www.naftaclaims.com/Disputes/USA/Methanex/MethanexDecisionReAuthorityAmicus.pdf 
[hereinafter Methanex, Amici Curiae Decision] 
7 Par. 53 (the Petitions for amicus curiae submissions were accepted by the Tribunal subject to procedural 
limitations) 
8 Par. 42 and 47  (“The  Tribunal  also  concludes  that   it  has  no  power  to  accept  the  Petitioners’  requests  to  
receive  materials  generated  within  the  arbitration  or  to  attend  oral  hearings  of  the  arbitration.”).   
9 See e.g. Biwater Gauff, Ltd. v. Tanzania, ICSID (World Bank) Case No. ARB/05/22, Procedural Order 
No 5 (February 2, 2007), para. 71  (“…Claimant  objects   to   the  presence  of   the  Petitioners  at   the  hearing.  
The   Arbitral   tribunal   therefore   has   no   power   to   permit   the   Petitioners’   presence   or   participation   at   the  
hearing,  and  must  accordingly  reject  its  application  in  this  regard”); Aguas Argentinas, S.A., Suez, Sociedad
General de Aguas de Barcelona, S.A., and Vivendi Universal S.A. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/03/19, Order in Response to a Petition for Transparency and Participation as Amicus Curiae (May 19, 
2005),   para.   33   (“…the   Tribunal   has   unanimously   decided   to:  …deny   Petitioners’   request   to   attend the 
hearings   of   this   case”), http://juris.prod.advomatic.com/files/free_pdfs/Suez%20v%20Argentina%20-
Response%20Amicus.pdf. 
10 Par. 46 and 47. 
11 Par. 30. 
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That narrow view of amici curiae as set out in the FTC Statement and Methanex has been 
upheld by more recent decisions. In Glamis Gold Ltd. v. United States,12 the NAFTA 
tribunal, dismissing regulatory expropriation and fair and equitable treatment claims, 
dealt with several amicus curiae submissions by the National Mining Association, the 
Quechan Indian Nation, Sierra Club and Earthworks, and Friends of the Earth. 
Confirming its earlier decision to accept each submission,13 the tribunal reinforced the 
restrictions on non-disputing parties recommended in the FTC Statement as follows:  
… The Tribunal expressed its view that it should apply strictly the requirements
specified in the FTC Statement, for example restrictions as to length or limitations 
as to the matters to be addressed, but that, given the public and remedial purposes 
of non-disputing submissions, leave to file and acceptance of submissions should 
be granted liberally. ... In accepting each submission, the Tribunal noted Section 
(B)(9) of the FTC Statement, which states that acceptance of a non-disputing 
submission does not require the Tribunal to consider that submission at any point 
in the arbitration, nor does it entitle the non-disputing party to make any further 
submissions. Finally, the Tribunal expressed its intent to ensure that the 
incorporation of any submission, or parts thereof, would not unduly burden the 
Parties or delay the proceedings.14 
Clearly, those limitations of the participation rights of amici are in themselves 
problematic. But even such a modest list of participation rights may not materialize at all 
for non-disputing parties seeking to participate in arbitration. Upon a request for amicus
curiae status, tribunals can deny it as they have the power and discretion, but not the 
12 Award (NAFTA Arb., June 8, 2009), http://www.naftaclaims.com/Disputes/USA/Glamis/Glamis-USA-
Award.pdf. 
13 On February 15, 2007, the Tribunal issued its decisions on the non-disputing party applications to file 
submissions in separate letters to each of the mentioned groups. The Tribunal decided to accept each 
submission. See para. 286. 
14 Para. 286. See also Glamis Gold Ltd. v. United States, Decision on Application and Submission by 
Quechan Indian Nation (Sept. 16, 2005), paras. 10-15 (following the FTC Statement, the granting of leave 
to file amicus curiae submissions do not require the Tribunal to address the submission at any point in the 
arbitration, nor does it entitle a non-disputing party to make further submissions). 
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duty, to allow amicus curiae.15 Even if tribunals do allow amicus curiae submissions, 
they can further restrict the participation rights of non-disputing parties. The tribunal in 
United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc. v. Canada asserted: 
…The power of the Tribunal to permit amicus submissions is not to be used in a
way which is unduly burdensome for the parties or which unnecessarily 
complicates the Tribunal process. The Tribunal envisages that it will place limits 
on the submissions to be made in writing in terms for instance of the length. The 
third parties would not have the opportunity to call witnesses …with the result 
that the disputing parties would not face the need to cross-examine them or call 
contradictory evidence. …16 
The submissions are to relate to issues raised by the disputing parties and cannot 
introduce new issues in the litigation or go beyond the scope of the case as 
defined by the disputing parties.17 
…The  Tribunal  does  not  expect that it will give leave to file submissions which
are longer than twenty pages (including schedules).18 
Thus, amici curiae currently offer a narrow list of legal rights to non-disputing parties to 
participate in NAFTA arbitrations. These legal limitations become even more 
problematic when such a narrow view of amici curiae is applied in the context of 
unorganized, financially weak or politically disadvantaged public interest groups. 
Ultimately, this may result in both censoring the views of such groups and playing the 
political role of symbolic accountability of investment arbitrations. 
15 United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc. v. Canada, Decision on Petitions for Intervention and Participation as 
Amici Curiae, (NAFTA Arb. 2001), paras. 63 and 64 (tribunals have the power -but no duty- to receive 
third party submissions), 
http://www.naftaclaims.com/Disputes/Canada/UPS/UPSDecisionReParticipationAmiciCuriae.pdf. 
16 United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc. v. Canada, Decision on Petitions for Intervention and Participation as 
Amici Curiae, (NAFTA Arb. 2001), para.  69.  See  also  para.  73  (“The  Tribunal  declares that it has power to 
accept written amicus briefs from the Petitioners. It will consider receiving them at the merits stage of the 
arbitration following consultation with the parties, exercising its discretion in the way indicated in this 
decision…”).   For   further   details   on   such   restrictions,   see   United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc. v. Canada, 
Direction of the Tribunal on the Participation of Amici Curiae, (NAFTA Arb., August 1, 2003), par. 3 
(“The   Order   is   limited   to   written   briefs.   It   does   not   extend   to   the   adducing   of   evidence…”),  
http://naftaclaims.com/Disputes/Canada/UPS/UPSFurtherOrderReAmicusSubs.pdf 
17 United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc. v. Canada, Direction of the Tribunal on the Participation of Amici
Curiae, (NAFTA Arb., August 1, 2003), par. 5. 
18 United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc. v. Canada, Direction of the Tribunal on the Participation of Amici
Curiae, (NAFTA Arb., August 1, 2003), par. 8. 
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TOWARDS AN EXPANSIVE VIEW OF AMICI CURIAE FOR PUBLIC 
INTEREST GROUPS 
 
It is therefore important to consider relaxing such restrictions and assigning more 
participation rights to non-disputing parties particularly public interest groups that 
advocate the protection of, for instance, public health such as anti-smoking citizen-
consumer groups. The proper defense of public health from the position of amicus may 
require a pleading of more than 20 pages, submissions of scientific evidence and access 
to the records in order to respond to the parties’  evidence  and  claims.  Such non-disputing 
parties should thus have the right to make longer written submissions such as in recent 
decisions between 30 and 50 pages19 as well as further written submissions and other 
evidence;20  access to the evidentiary record and the  disputing  parties’  submissions;21 and 
the right to attend hearings and make oral submissions. In fact, most non-disputing 
                                                 
19 See e.g. Biwater Gauff, Ltd. v. Tanzania, ICSID (World Bank) Case No. ARB/05/22, Procedural Order 
No 5 (February 2, 2007), para.  60 (accepting a request of several groups for an amicus curiae participation, 
the  Tribunal  stated  that  “…the  Petitioners,   jointly,  should  file  a  single,   initial  written  submission,  …,  but  
limited to a maximum of 50 pages (double-spaced)….”),   
http://juris.prod.advomatic.com/files/free_pdfs/Biwater%20v%20Tanzania%20-
%20Procedural%20Order%20No.%205.pdf; Epaminontas Triantafilou, A More Expansive Role for Amici 
Curiae in Investment Arbitration?, KLUWER ARB. BLOG (May 11, 2009), 
http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2009/05/11/a-more-expansive-role-foramici-curiae-in-investment-
arbitration/. 
20 Tribunals have considered requesting further submissions from non-disputing parties. See e.g. Biwater 
Gauff, Ltd. v. Tanzania, ICSID (World Bank) Case No. ARB/05/22, Procedural Order No 5 (February 2, 
2007), para. 72   (“…the   Arbitral   Tribunal   reserves   the   right   to   ask   the   Petitioners specific questions in 
relation to their written submission, and to request the filing of further written submissions and/or 
documents  or  other  evidence,  …”). 
21 Some tribunals have considered the possibility of allowing non-disputing parties to have access to 
documents filed by parties. See e.g. Biwater Gauff, Ltd. v. Tanzania, ICSID (World Bank) Case No. 
ARB/05/22 (2007), Procedural Order No 5, para. 66   (“…Once   the April hearing has been concluded, 
however, the concerns with respect to procedural integrity may be altered, and if so, there may then be less 
impediment to the disclosure of documents to non-disputing  parties.  …”), 
http://juris.prod.advomatic.com/files/free_pdfs/Biwater%20v%20Tanzania%20-
%20Procedural%20Order%20No.%205.pdf. 
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parties have requested a similar list of participation rights in several NAFTA cases in 
which they were granted amicus curiae status.22 This expansive non-disputing party 
participation becomes even more important for improving the consistency and public 
accountability   of   the   NAFTA   tribunal’s decisions in light of the fact that Chapter 11 
tribunals’ decisions are not subject to judicial review on their merits.23 
 
The value of such expansive non-disputing party participation is not limited to improving 
the decisions of tribunals and, more generally, the transparency and the legitimacy of 
NAFTA arbitration mechanism, as most scholars argue.24 It also serves to legally 
empower public interest groups to balance the influence of foreign investors on domestic 
                                                 
22 See Methanex Corp. v. United States, Decision of the Tribunal on Petitions from Third Persons to 
Intervene  as  “Amici  Curiae”  (NAFTA  Arb.,  Jan.  15,  2001),  paras.  5  and  7,  
http://www.naftaclaims.com/Disputes/USA/Methanex/MethanexDecisionReAuthorityAmicus.pdf 
[hereinafter Methanex, Amici Curiae Decision]; United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc. v. Canada, Decision on 
Petitions for Intervention and Participation as Amici Curiae, (NAFTA Arb., October 17,  2001), par. 4, 
http://www.naftaclaims.com/Disputes/Canada/UPS/UPSDecisionReParticipation 
AmiciCuriae.pdf; Glamis Gold Ltd. v. United States, Award (NAFTA Arb., June 8, 2009), para. 290 
(various non-disputing parties requested access to the hearing and the Tribunal invited the Quechan to view 
the proceedings from a different location), http://www.naftaclaims.com/Disputes/USA/Glamis/Glamis-
USA-Award.pdf; see also documents in which the request for access to the hearings was made: Letter to 
the Tribunal from Earthjustice (Apr. 25, 2007); Letter to the Tribunal from Courtney Ann Coyle, Esq. (June 
26, 2007) (requesting the ability of the Quechan to view all aspects of the proceedings so as to monitor the 
protection of tribal cultural resources confidentiality). 
23 NAFTA, arts. 201 T 2, 1136 6. Although domestic courts are not allowed to review tribunals' application 
of the law, they can only set aside NAFTA tribunal decisions that went beyond the scope of its jurisdiction. 
See Mexico v. Metalclad Corp., [2001] 89 B.C.L.R.3d 359, 2001 BCSC 664 IT 67, 99 (Can.) (to the British 
Columbia Supreme Court, acting as the appeal court, the issue was "whether the Tribunal made decisions 
on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration by deciding upon matters outside Chapter 
11"); see also INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, PRIVATE 
RIGHTS, PUBLIC PROBLEMS: A GUIDE TO NAFTA's CONTROVERSIAL CHAPTER ON 
INVESTOR RIGHTS 41 (2001), available at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/tradecitizensguide.pdf, Julie 
Soloway, NAFTA's Chapter 11: Investor Protection, Integration, and the Public Interest, in 
SUSTAINABILITY, CIVIL SOCIETY AND INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE, at 137, 140 ("[A] 
domestic court will not be entitled to review a decision on its merits, but rather, it may only rule on the 
much narrower legal question of whether the tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction in any way."). 
24 See generally e.g. Barnali Choudhury, Recapturing Public Power: Is Investment Arbitration's 
Engagement of the Public Interest Contributing to the Democratic Deficit?, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L 
L. 775, 809 (2008) (“transparency   through   public   access   to   the   investment   arbitration   process   or  
involvement   of   amici   curiae   on   public   interest   issues  …adds   to   the   credibility   of   this   decision   making  
process  and  helps  to  legitimize  the  process  in  the  eyes  of  the  public.”) 
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policy-making in and beyond arbitration. In particular, public interest groups will be in a 
better position to contribute to the determination of the public purpose and the 
proportionality of government measures and offset the over-influence of the corporate 
discourse. 
 
Past attempts by public interest groups to influence NAFTA arbitrations, even under a 
narrow approach to amici curiae, show the potential of non-disputing party participation. 
In Methanex Corp. v. United States, Decision on amicus curiae,25 the tribunal dealt with 
petitions by the International Institute for Sustainable Development, Communities for a 
Better Environment, the Bluewater Network of Earth Island Institute and the Center for 
International Environmental Law, requesting to appear as amici curiae on the basis of the 
immense public importance of the case. The   Institute   also   contended   that   “the  
interpretation of Chapter 11 of NAFTA should reflect legal principles underlying the 
concept of sustainable development; and that the Institute could assist the Tribunal in this 
respect”.26 Furthermore,  the  Institute  argued  that  “there  was  an  increased  urgency in the 
need for amicus participation   in   the   light   of   the   award  …   in  Metalclad Corporation v. 
United Mexican States and an alleged failure to consider environmental and sustainable 
development  goals   in   that  NAFTA  arbitration.”27 The Methanex tribunal, accepting the 
petitions and even adopting a narrow view of amicus curiae,28  recognized the relevance 
                                                 
25 Methanex Corp. v. United States, Decision of the Tribunal on Petitions from Third Persons to Intervene 
as   “Amici   Curiae”   (NAFTA   Arb.,   Jan.   15,   2001),  
http://www.naftaclaims.com/Disputes/USA/Methanex/MethanexDecisionReAuthorityAmicus.pdf 
[hereinafter Methanex, Amici Curiae Decision] 
26 Par. 5. 
27 Par. 6 
28 Par. 53. 
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of allowing such groups to participate in a Chapter 11 arbitration in which the public 
interest was at stake: 
There is an undoubted public interest in this arbitration. The substantive issues 
extend far beyond those raised by the usual transnational arbitration between 
private parties. This is not merely because one of the disputing parties is a State 
…   The   public   interest   in   this   arbitration   arises   from   its   subject   matter,   as  
powerfully suggested in the Petitions. There is also a broader argument, as 
suggested by the [United States] and Canada: the Chapter 11 arbitral process 
could benefit from being perceived as more open or transparent, or conversely be 
harmed if seen as unduly secretive. In   this   regard,   the  Tribunal’s  willingness   to  
receive amicus submissions might support the process in general and this 
arbitration in particular, whereas a blanket refusal could do positive harm.29 
 
Interestingly, departing from Metalclad and deciding on the main issue, the Methanex 
tribunal held the view that the public purpose behind the regulatory measure was 
paramount and trumped all, making the regulation a lawful one and thus permitted under 
NAFTA.30 The public purpose was decisive, finding no expropriation and no obligation 
to compensate.31 
 
Similarly, in United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc. v. Canada, decision on amicus curiae,32 the 
Canadian Union of Postal Workers and the Council of Canadians, seeking expansive 
amicus curiae rights, contended that there was a public interest in that arbitration and 
                                                 
29 Methanex Corp. v. United States, Decision of the Tribunal on Petitions from Third Persons to Intervene 
as   “Amici   Curiae”   (NAFTA   Arb.,   Jan.   15,   2001),   par.   49,  
http://www.naftaclaims.com/Disputes/USA/Methanex/MethanexDecisionReAuthorityAmicus.pdf 
[hereinafter Methanex, Amici Curiae Decision]. This reasoning has been followed by non-NAFTA 
tribunals. See e.g. Biwater Gauff, Ltd. v. Tanzania, ICSID (World Bank) Case No. ARB/05/22, Procedural 
Order No 5 (February 2, 2007), para. 51. 
30 Methanex Corp. v. United States, 44 I.L.M. 1345, pt IV, 15 (NAFTA/UNCITRAL Arb. Trib. 2005). 
31 Id. 
32 United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc. v. Canada, Decision on Petitions for Intervention and Participation as 
Amici Curiae, (NAFTA Arb., October 17,  2001), 
http://www.naftaclaims.com/Disputes/Canada/UPS/UPSDecisionReParticipationAmiciCuriae.pdf. 
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they have real interest in adding a perspective that clearly departs from the view of 
foreign investors: 
…the claim raises issues of broad public interest which extend well beyond postal 
services to other public and social services. Further, the expansive interpretation 
of NAFTA urged by the Investor would dramatically expand the scope for foreign 
investor claims and put at risk a broad diversity of government measures that 
should not be vulnerable to such claims. …   They say that they are uniquely 
qualified to contribute a perspective on these matters of broader public interest, a 
perspective which would otherwise be absent.33 
 
Non-NAFTA tribunals have also allowed amicus curiae participation by public interest 
groups34 because of their potential contribution to improve the tribunal decisions on 
matters affecting the public interest, human rights and consumers rights. For example, in 
Aguas Argentinas, S.A., Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona, S.A., and 
Vivendi Universal S.A. v. Argentina,35 five non-governmental organizations requested 
amicus curiae participation, namely Asociación Civil por la Igualdad y la Justicia (ACIJ), 
Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales (CELS), Center for International Environmental 
Law (CIEL), Consumidores Libres Cooperativa Ltda. de Provisión de Servicios de 
Acción Comunitaria, and Unión de Usuarios y Consumidores. The Aguas Argentinas 
tribunal noted that the public interest warranted allowing NGOs to participate as amicus 
and recognized that non-parties can provide a perspective that can help decide a matter 
that will affect millions of citizens-consumers and will also have an impact on human 
rights: 
                                                 
33 Par. 14. 
34 See e.g. V. Vadi, Critical Comparisons: The Role of Comparative Law in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 
Denv.   J.   Int'l   L.   &   Pol'y,   (2010)   (“Increasingly, investment arbitration tribunals have allowed public 
interest  groups  to  present  amicus  curiae  briefs  or  have  access  to  the  arbitral  process.  …”),  V.  Vadi,  Cultural 
Diversity Disputes and The Judicial Function in International Investment Law, Syracuse J. Int'l L. & Com., 
(2011) (noting the same). 
35 ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, Order in Response to a Petition for Transparency and Participation as 
Amicus Curiae (May 19, 2005) 
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…The factor that gives this case particular public interest is that the investment 
dispute centers around the water distribution and sewage systems of a large 
metropolitan area, the city of Buenos Aires and surrounding municipalities. Those 
systems provide basic public services to millions of people and as a result may 
raise a variety of complex public and international law questions, including 
human rights considerations. Any decision rendered in this case, whether in favor 
of the Claimants or the Respondent, has the potential to affect the operation of 
those systems and thereby the public they serve.  
These factors lead the Tribunal to conclude that this case does involve matters of 
public interest of such a nature that have traditionally led courts and other 
tribunals to receive amicus submissions from suitable nonparties. … 
Given the public interest in the subject matter of this case, it is possible that 
appropriate nonparties may be able to afford the Tribunal perspectives, 
arguments, and expertise that will help it arrive at a correct decision. …36 
 
 
Similarly, in Biwater Gauff, Ltd. v. Tanzania,37 five petitioners filed a petition for amicus 
curiae status:   the  Lawyers’  Environmental  Action  Team,   the   Legal   and Human Rights 
Centre, the Tanzania Gender Networking Programme, the Center for International 
Environmental Law and the International Institute for Sustainable Development.38 The 
Petitioners stated that the privatization at issue in that arbitration was conceived to work 
towards the goal of halving the proportion of people who are unable to reach or to afford 
safe drinking water as committed by the international community in the UN Millennium 
Declaration.39 They  further  claimed  that  the  arbitration  “has  a  substantial influence on the 
population’s   ability   to   enjoy   basic   human   rights.”40 Allowing the petitioners to make 
limited amicus submissions,41 the   tribunal   envisaged   “that   the   Petitioners   will   address  
                                                 
36 Ibid. paras. 19-21. 
37 ICSID (World Bank) Case No. ARB/05/22 (2007), Procedural Order No 5, paras. 1, 55, 
http://juris.prod.advomatic.com/files/free_pdfs/Biwater%20v%20Tanzania%20-
%20Procedural%20Order%20No.%205.pdf. 
38 Ibid. para. 1. 
39 Ibid. para. 13. 
40 Ibid. para. 14. 
41 For example, the Tribunal rejected their request to attend oral hearings and open access to documents 
was not granted. 
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broad policy issues concerning sustainable development, environment, human rights and 
governmental  policy”.42   
 
Public interest groups can also help establish the proportionality of a measure. For 
instance, public pressure by public interest groups may be an important consideration in 
legally legitimizing bona fide, non-discriminatory regulatory measures for pressing 
public purposes. “In Tecmed, the tribunal reasoned that the social and political 
circumstances that surround a regulatory decision are also important factors in assessing 
the proportionality of the measure and establishing unlawful expropriation. In particular, 
the tribunal suggest that an otherwise expropriatory regulation will not be categorized as 
expropriation where it is implemented in proportional response to a serious urgent 
situation or social emergency.”43 
 
A regulatory response and an urgent situation or social emergency are to some extent 
socially constructed and interest groups play an important role in both constructing such a 
situation or emergency and pressing for a regulatory response. Thus, the presence or 
absence of active interest groups is likely to determine the NAFTA legitimacy of a 
regulatory action as they are involved in the social construction of the response and the 
urgent situation or social emergency. It follows that, in the case of tobacco regulation and 
with an expansive amicus curiae, public interest groups advocating appropriate measures 
to reduce extremely high levels of tobacco consumption among, for example, aboriginal 
communities may be in a stronger position to demonstrate the urgency of the situation 
                                                 
42 Ibid. para. 64. 
43 Alberto Salazar V., “NAFTA  Chapter  11,  Regulatory  Expropriation  and  Domestic  Counter-Advertising 
Law”  (2010)  27  Arizona  Journal  of  International  and  Comparative  Law  31 at 80. 
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and disseminate information about the proportionality and public purpose of a measure in 
and outside an arbitration. 
 
Furthermore, expansive non-disputing party participation will reduce the chilling effect 
of foreign investors’  use  of  NAFTA  Chapter  11  suits.  Public  interest  groups  empowered  
with greater participation rights can be perceived as strong advocates of public health 
before, during and after an arbitration, which may discourage excessive threat of NAFTA 
lawsuits by foreign investors. This will create an institutional environment that favors a 
more balanced use of NAFTA Chapter 11 in which public policy and the interest of 
investors are better balanced even without reaching arbitration. 
 
Moreover, an expansive non-disputing party participation is likely to induce the growth 
and the greater engagement of public interest groups with investment arbitrations and 
public debate as spheres of promoting public policy. Such groups may be encouraged by 
an expansive amicus curiae to seek more participation in arbitration cases as they may 
feel that their views can be communicated more effectively and be influential. The 
possibility that amici curiae can increase the participation of public interest groups is 
real. In fact, that was the fear of Methanex Corporation that raised that concern to oppose 
the granting of a (narrow) amicus curiae status to several public interest groups in 
Methanex.44 Such increased participation of public interest groups in arbitration will in 
turn incentivize them to further engage in domestic policy-making and challenge the 
                                                 
44 See Methanex Corp. v. United States, Decision of the Tribunal on Petitions from Third Persons to 
Intervene  as  “Amici  Curiae”  (NAFTA  Arb.,  Jan.  15,  2001),  par.  14  (“…An  undesirable  precedent  would  be  
set and other groups might be encouraged to seek to appear as amici in arbitrations under Chapter 11 of 
NAFTA”),http://www.naftaclaims.com/Disputes/USA/Methanex/MethanexDecisionReAuthorityAmicus.p
df [hereinafter Methanex, Amici Curiae Decision] 
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influence of corporate groups. From this perspective, amici curiae turn out to be an 
important legal institution that mediates in the broader competition between interest 
groups involved in public policy-making under the pressures of economic globalization. 
Needless to say, such impact of an expansive amici not only will help fix the democratic 
deficit of NAFTA but also contribute to improve the democratic nature of domestic law 
and policy making. 
 
The overall impact of such expansive view of amici curiae will probably be the 
defragmentation of NAFTA Chapter 11, that is to say, public interest groups will be 
empowered to introduce public interest considerations such as human rights, 
environmental protection and public health into NAFTA analysis that are likely to protect 
the interest of local citizen-consumers. However, the effectiveness of an expansive 
amicus curiae requires not only greater legal powers for public interest groups. It also 
needs to pay attention to the financial and political conditions that will favor an effective 
participation of public interest groups in NAFTA disputes. 
 
AMICI CURIAE IN CONTEXT: TOBACCO REGULATION AND COMPETING 
INTEREST GROUPS IN CANADA 
 
The role of public interest groups in the development of tobacco control policies in 
Canada provides an interesting example of the significance of the social context of amici 
curiae in NAFTA disputes. In particular, a close examination of the attempts to introduce 
plain packaging legislation in Canada and the role of competing interest groups reveals 
 18 
that unfavorable financial and political conditions may hinder the ability of public interest 
groups to participate in NAFTA disputes and policy-making more generally. 
 
There is some evidence that the tobacco industry has been engaging in several strategies 
to influence the meaning of NAFTA expropriation provisions and the perception and 
beliefs associated with what constitutes a NAFTA-based legitimate tobacco control 
measure, as part of their broader strategies to influence tobacco consumption and its 
regulation in society. In “May  10,  1994. Carla Hills (on behalf of Philip Morris and RJ 
Reynolds) tells the Standing Committee that Plain Packaging would be an infringement 
of  GATT,  NAFTA  and  the  Paris  Convention.”45 The plain packaging initiative in Canada 
ultimately failed in 1995 when the Supreme Court of Canada invalidated the Canadian 
Tobacco Products Control Act. It is widely believed that RJR’s   NAFTA suit threat 
deterred the Canadian government from instituting plain packaging before the Court 
ruling.46 
 
Similarly, Phillip Morris engaged in a campaign to oppose the attempt of Canada's 
government to regulate the wording of cigarette marketing. In 2001, the Government of 
Canada proposed a regulation to "prohibit the display of 'light' and 'mild' descriptors on 
tobacco packaging.”47 Phillip Morris International Inc. protested the ban on the basis of 
                                                 
45 Physicians for Smoke-Free   Canada   “The   Plot   Against   Plain   Packaging   How   multinational   tobacco  
companies colluded to use trade arguments they knew were phoney to oppose plain packaging. And how 
health   ministers   in   Canada   and   Australia   fell   for   their   chicanery.” (2008), http://www.smoke-
free.ca/pdf_1/plotagainstplainpackaging-apr1'.pdf 
46 http://jurist.org/forum/2011/12/allyn-taylor-tobacco-suit.php 
47 See Tobacco.org, Philip Morris Submission to Canada on NAFTA 's Chapter 11 Provision, 
http://www.tobacco.org/Documents/0203pmnafta.html). See also Alberto Salazar V., “NAFTA  Chapter  11,  
Regulatory Expropriation and Domestic Counter-Advertising   Law”   (2010)   27   Arizona   Journal   of  
International and Comparative Law 31 at 69-70. 
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Chapter 11 arguing that, "the ban would be tantamount to an expropriation of tobacco 
trademarks containing descriptive terms.”48 The proposed regulation was never fully 
developed. The threat of a NAFTA Chapter 11 lawsuit convinced Canada to back down 
from instituting plain packaging with health warnings for cigarettes.49 
 
The debate over plain packaging of cigarettes has gained momentum in Canada with the 
recent  decision  of  Australia’s  Supreme  Court  to  uphold  such  legislation  which  has  come  
into force on December 1, 2012.50 Plain packaging legislation will bar tobacco companies 
from displaying their brand designs, colours and logos on cigarette packs which will 
instead feature bigger health warnings and strong anti-smoking images. In Canada, the 
tobacco industry and anti-smoking groups have reinvigorated their opposite views. For 
example, the Canadian Cancer Society, the Non-Smokers' Rights Association and 
Physicians for a Smoke-Free Canada are urging the adoption of plain packaging laws 
                                                 
48 Id. See also Donald W. Zeigler, International Trade Agreements Challenge Tobacco and Alcohol 
Control Policies, 25 DRUG & ALCOHOL REV. 567, 568 (2006) (explaining that "Philip Morris used [a 
technical barrier to trade] argument[] to contest a Canadian ban on use of the terms 'mild' and 'light' in 
cigarette promotion, because the corporation said that a ban was not the least trade restrictive alternative to 
reduce tobacco-related problems."). 
49 See Physicians for Smoke-Free  Canada  “The  Plot  Against  Plain  Packaging  How  multinational   tobacco  
companies colluded to use trade arguments they knew were phoney to oppose plain packaging. And how 
health   ministers   in   Canada   and   Australia   fell   for   their   chicanery.”   (2008),   http://www.smoke-
free.ca/pdf_1/plotagainstplainpackaging-apr1'.pdf 
“2002:  Canadian  proposals  to  ban  ‘light’  descriptors 
Philip Morris filed a notice claiming that any bans on trademarks would be an expropriation, inconsistent 
with Chapter 11 of NAFTA, saying that they had "invested substantial sums to develop brand identity and 
consumer loyalty  for  these  low  yield  products.”  Canada  has  yet  to  impose  regulations  banning  these  terms,  
although  a  voluntary  agreement  was  reached  with  Philip  Morris’  subsidiary  and  other  tobacco  companies.”  
See also ROBERT WEISSMAN, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS AND TOBACCO 
CONTROL: THREATS TO PUBLIC HEALTH AND THE CASE FOR EXCLUDING TOBACCO FROM 
TRADE AGREEMENTS (2003); E.R. Shaffer, J.E. Brenner & T.P. Houston, International Trade 
Agreements: A Threat to Tobacco Control Policy, 14 TOBACCO CONTROL (SUPPLEMENT II) iil9, ii22 
(2005); Ellen Gould, Trade Treaties and Alcohol Advertising Policy, 26 J. PUB. HEALTH POL'Y 359 
(2005); Interview by Runako Kumbula with Cynthia Callard, Executive Director, Physicians for a Smoke 
Free Canada (Apr. 1, 2002). 
50 “Cigarette plain packaging laws come into force in Australia. Smoking warnings and diseased body parts 
emblazoned   on   dull   green   boxes   that   are   the   same   for   all   tobacco   brands”   The Guardian (Saturday 1 
December 2012), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/dec/01/plain-packaging-australian-cigarette-
tobacco. 
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following   Australia’s   precedent.51 On the other hand, Imperial Tobacco Canada, a 
subsidiary of British American Tobacco and one of the companies that has challenged the 
Australian legislation, has questioned the effectiveness of plain packaging of tobacco 
products in discouraging youth initiation or encouraging cessation by existing smokers.52 
This debate is expected to grow and NAFTA arguments against plain packaging 
legislation will probably be a central part of that debate. Indeed, trade objections to such 
legislation have recently been raised by Philip  Morris  Asia  that  is  challenging  Australia’s  
plain packaging legislation under the 1993 bilateral investment treaty between Australia 
and Hong Kong. 
 
While the tobacco industry is actively influencing the meaning and use of NAFTA 
Chapter 11 and appears to have succeeded in deterring plain packaging legislation, anti-
smoking groups and other public interest groups are not necessarily in the same position 
to exert such degree of influence. Such groups often lack the financial resources and 
                                                 
51 “Canadian anti-smoking advocates urge plain packaging laws. Tobacco companies say current labelling 
laws infringe on rights”  CBC News (August 15, 2012),  
http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/story/2012/08/15/tobacco-plain-packaging-laws-canadian-reaction.html; 
Carly  Weeks  “Canada’s  cigarette  warning   labels  could  still  go  further,   report   finds”  The Globe and Mail 
(November 14, 2012), (reporting that Rob Cunningham, an analyst with the Canadian Cancer Society, has 
indicated that “[w]e urge the federal government to take steps toward implementing plain packaging in 
Canada  …If Australia can do it and other countries are actively looking at it, Canada can similarly make 
steps to move forward”;;   “Given that Canada was the first country to introduce graphic warnings on 
cigarette   packages,   there’s   no   reason   to   delay   implementing   plain   packaging   here,   said   Neil   Collishaw,  
research director of Physicians for a Smoke-Free  Canada.”), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/life/health-
and-fitness/health/canadas-cigarette-warning-labels-could-still-go-further-report-finds/article5253202/ 
52 “Canadian anti-smoking advocates urge plain packaging laws. Tobacco companies say current labelling 
laws   infringe   on   rights”  CBC News (August 15, 2012), (reporting comments by Caroline Ferland, vice-
president of corporate and regulatory affairs for Imperial Tobacco Canada) 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/story/2012/08/15/tobacco-plain-packaging-laws-canadian-reaction.html; 
Omid Ghoreishi “Canada  Urged  to  Follow  Australia’s  New  Cigarette  Packaging  Law.  No proof that plain 
packaging  will  deter  smoking,  says  tobacco  company”  The EpochTimes (August 22, 2012) (reporting the 
same). 
 21 
ability to launch massive campaigns and lobby governments for further intervention to 
reduce tobacco consumption. 
 
That problem has recently become more evident with the decision of the government of 
Canada to cut funding for anti-smoking groups. The Non-Smokers' Rights Association, 
for example, is taking a 40 per cent hit to its budget because of the cuts to the grants 
program.53 Health groups and tobacco control advocates are of course appalled. Garfield 
Mahood, founding executive director of the Non-Smokers’  Rights  Association, has raised 
concerns about the impact of such decision indicating that the only winner is really Big 
Tobacco. 54 “By  slashing  funding  to  health  groups,   the  Harper  government  has  virtually  
assured that tobacco companies will have the upper hand in influencing federal policy 
decisions.” 55 The funding grants to anti-smoking   groups   have   “helped   counter   the  
influence  of   tobacco  companies  and   their   lobbying  efforts  …  and  have  helped  with   the  
research  behind  successful  campaigns  and  policy  initiatives.”56 
 
What is most concerning is that these funding cuts may undermine anti-smoking groups 
that seek to represent vulnerable groups with high tobacco consumption rates. For 
                                                 
53 “Anti-smoking groups decry cuts by Health Canada. Groups say  health  of  Canadians  at  risk” (CBC 
News, Apr 17, 2012), http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/ottawa/story/2012/04/17/pol-0tobacco-cuts.html 
54 Geoffrey   Lansdell,   “How   the  Conservatives   are   gutting   tobacco   control”,  Macleans, Friday, May 18, 
2012, online: http://www2.macleans.ca/2012/05/18/how-the-conservatives-are-gutting-tobacco-control/ 
(October 11, 2012) 
55 Geoffrey   Lansdell,   “How   the  Conservatives   are   gutting   tobacco   control”,  Macleans, Friday, May 18, 
2012, online: http://www2.macleans.ca/2012/05/18/how-the-conservatives-are-gutting-tobacco-control/ 
(October 11, 2012). See also “Anti-smoking groups decry cuts by Health Canada. Groups say health of 
Canadians   at   risk” (CBC News, Apr 17, 2012), 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/ottawa/story/2012/04/17/pol-0tobacco-cuts.html (raising the same 
concerns). 
56 “Anti-smoking groups decry cuts by Health   Canada.   Groups   say   health   of   Canadians   at   risk”   (CBC  
News, Apr 17, 2012), http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/ottawa/story/2012/04/17/pol-0tobacco-cuts.html 
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instance, smoking rates are out of control among aboriginal populations. “Tobacco-
related illnesses and diseases are urgent issues in First Nations and Inuit communities, 
where   smoking   rates   are   more   than   triple   the   rate   for   the   rest   of   Canada”.57 Similar 
concerns are expressed for other groups with high prevalence of tobacco consumption 
such as youth, ethnic minorities and low income people.58 This should not be surprising 
because “smoking is now clearly associated with disadvantage and inequity.”59 Although 
approximately 20% of the Canadian population smokes, certain subpopulations have 
higher prevalence, including Aboriginals, low-income people, and homeless people.60 
Recent estimates indicate that the smoking rate in Canada's aboriginal population is close 
to 50 per cent.61 Despite the general funding cuts to health groups, it is reported that there 
will still be $7 million in this year's $38-million budget for grants and contributions to 
health groups, but the government intends to direct that money mostly to aboriginal 
                                                 
57 Health Canada, First Nations & Inuit Health > Substance Use & Treatment of Addictions, online:  
http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/fniah-spnia/substan/tobac-tabac/index-eng.php (October 11, 2012) 
58 Heart and Stroke Foundation of Canada Position Statement, BECOMING OR REMAINING 
TOBACCO-FREE, online:  
http://www.heartandstroke.com/site/c.ikIQLcMWJtE/b.3799307/k.E453/Position_Statements__Tobacco_P
osition_Statement.htm (October 19, 2012) 
59 Lorraine Greaves, PhD1 Natasha Jategaonkar, MSc1, Joy Johnson, PhD, RN2 Melissa McGowan, 
MHK1 Joan Bottorff, PhD, RN3 Lucy McCullough, BSc1, Susan Kirkland, PhD4 Lupin Battersby, MA1, 
“What  Are  the  Effects  of  Tobacco  Policies  on  Vulnerable  Populations?  A  Better  Practices  Review” 
JULY – AUGUST 2006, VOLUME 97, NO. 4 CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PUBLIC HEALTH 310, at 
310 
60 Lorraine Greaves, PhD1 Natasha Jategaonkar, MSc1, Joy Johnson, PhD, RN2 Melissa McGowan, 
MHK1 Joan Bottorff, PhD, RN3 Lucy McCullough, BSc1, Susan Kirkland, PhD4 Lupin Battersby, MA1, 
“What  Are  the  Effects  of  Tobacco  Policies  on  Vulnerable  Populations?  A  Better  Practices  Review” 
JULY – AUGUST 2006, VOLUME 97, NO. 4 CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PUBLIC HEALTH 310, at 
310 (indicating the following smoking rates: Aboriginals (70%), low-income people (23%), and homeless 
people (69-75%).) 
61 “Anti-smoking  groups  decry  cuts  by  Health  Canada.  Groups  say  health  of  Canadians  at  risk”  (CBC  
News, Apr 17, 2012), (“While the national smoking rate is at 17 per cent, the smoking rate in Canada's 
aboriginal  population  is  close  to  50  per  cent.”),  
http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/ottawa/story/2012/04/17/pol-0tobacco-cuts.html; Paul  Taylor,  “Ottawa  
under fire for cutting funding to anti-smoking  program”,  The Globe and Mail (September 6, 2012) 
(reporting the same smoking rate for aboriginal groups), http://m.theglobeandmail.com/life/health-and-
fitness/ottawa-under-fire-for-cutting-funding-to-anti-smoking-program/article4101107/?service=mobile 
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groups,62 which reportedly will be the new focus of the anti-smoking program.63 It is 
important to remember, however, that in 2006 the government “suspended”  $10  million  
in annual funding for the First Nations and Inuit Tobacco Control Strategy.64 
 
Groups with high prevalence of tobacco consumption may need organized representation 
and engage in advocacy to promote favorable tobacco control policies. Yet, they have 
also been financially weakened by funding cuts for anti-smoking groups. Moreover, 
recent general funding cuts are further weakening the ability of such groups to advocate, 
inter alia, tobacco policies that meet their needs. For instance, the government is 
drastically  reducing  general  funding  for  aboriginal  communities.  “The core funding of the 
Federation of Saskatchewan Indian Nations will be cut to $500,000 per year from the 
current $1.6 million by 2013-14. Tribal councils will face cuts of 20 to 40 per cent. The 
Metis Nation – Saskatchewan …   is also being cut.”65 First Nations in Northern Ontario 
are currently preparing for looming federal funding cuts and caps that could slash their 
budgets in half.66 First Nations leaders believe that such funding cuts seek to weaken 
                                                 
62 “Anti-smoking groups decry cuts  by  Health  Canada.  Groups  say  health  of  Canadians  at  risk”  (CBC  
News, Apr 17, 2012), http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/ottawa/story/2012/04/17/pol-0tobacco-cuts.html 
63 Paul   Taylor,   “Ottawa   under   fire   for   cutting   funding   to   anti-smoking   program”,   The Globe and Mail 
(September 6, 2012) (“…now  is  the  time  to  make  changes  that  focus  on  those  populations  that  are  smoking  
far   more   than   the   national   average,”   Health   Minster   [sic]   Leona   Aglukkaq   said   in   a   statement.   “In  
particular,   aboriginal   populations   within   Canada   have   rates   as   high   as   50   per   cent.”), 
http://m.theglobeandmail.com/life/health-and-fitness/ottawa-under-fire-for-cutting-funding-to-anti-
smoking-program/article4101107/?service=mobile 
64 Geoffrey   Lansdell,   “How   the  Conservatives   are   gutting   tobacco   control”,  Macleans, Friday, May 18, 
2012, online: http://www2.macleans.ca/2012/05/18/how-the-conservatives-are-gutting-tobacco-control/ 
(October 11, 2012) 
65 http://www.thestarphoenix.com/news/Feds+funding+native+groups/7204178/story.html 
66 “First Nations brace for 'nefarious' funding cuts. Grand Chief says cuts could "bankrupt" Nishnawbe 
Aski Nation”  (CBC News, Nov 14, 2012), http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/sudbury/story/2012/11/14/tby-
first-nation-funding-cuts.html. 
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their capacity to deal with environmental assessments, companies and business 
agreements. 67  
 
The interest and voice of groups with high rates of tobacco consumption are thus likely to 
be both underrepresented in tobacco policy-making and debilitated for defending a 
favorable policy from NAFTA challenges. In such a context, it will be easier for 
governments to continue neglecting the needs of such groups and for the tobacco industry 
to expand their influence on NAFTA-based tobacco policies and their market share 
associated with such groups. Indeed, for example, tobacco advertising received via US 
media sources increasingly targets vulnerable groups such as youth, women, 
ethnocultural groups and gays and lesbians.68 
 
Thus, public interest groups such as anti-smoking groups are not only financially and 
politically disadvantaged, but also their current legal rights to participate as amicus 
curiae in NAFTA arbitrations are severely limited. This in practice censors their views 
and influence that in turn worsens the public accountability of NAFTA arbitration and 
further empowers the views of foreign investors to the detriment of the public interest. It 
is then difficult to expect a significant improvement in the balancing of foreign  investors’  
interest and public policy and, more generally, in the democratic nature of policy-making. 
Given the erosion of the financial basis of public interest groups and the modest rights of 
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non-disputing parties, amici curiae is of little help for such groups and rather play the 
symbolic  role  of  legitimizing  the  predominance  of  trade  and  foreign  investors’  interest  by  
giving the appearance of public accountability. 
 
While expansive amici curiae appear to be important for anti-smoking groups in the 
context of defending a policy from NAFTA challenges before, during or after an 
arbitration, the economic and political conditions for public interest groups to participate 
in NAFTA disputes should not be underestimated. Indeed, an amicus curiae institution 
may provide broader participation rights, but the lack of financial or political resources 
may prevent civil society groups to effectively participate in NAFTA disputes as amicus 
curiae. A defragmentation project seeking to protect local citizen-consumers via amici 
curiae thus requires not only a facilitative legal framework but also financially and 
politically strong public interest groups capable of advocating the public interest in the 
face of influential corporate discourses. Moreover, considerations should be given to the 
need to develop a duty of governments and foreign investors to not interfere with the 
growth of relevant public interest groups that are likely to participate as non-disputing 
parties in NAFTA Chapter 11 disputes. This might include the government’s  obligation  
to provide basic funding for public interest groups working in the area of, for example, 
public health. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
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Concerns about the inconsistency and unpredictability associated with the application of 
NAFTA Chapter 11 and the difficulties  in  balancing  foreign  investors’  interest  and  public  
policy are common and unresolved. The institutional environment suggests that interest 
groups also play a role in the social construction of the meaning and use of NAFTA 
Chapter 11 through arbitration and public debate. This work discusses the extent to which 
amici curiae empower public interest groups such as citizen-consumer groups. It argued 
that currently amici curiae provide an extremely narrow list of participation rights to 
public interest groups that, coupled with economic and political disadvantages in many 
cases, result in both censoring the views of such groups and playing the political role of 
symbolic accountability. This work proposes an expansive view of amici curiae for 
public interest groups in light of the potential of the latter to counter the influence of 
corporate interest groups and to contribute to both minimize the NAFTA Chapter 11 
inconsistencies and strike a more realistic balance between the public interest and foreign 
investors’   interest.  Ultimately, such a view of amici curiae is likely to help defragment 
NAFTA Chapter 11 as public interest groups will be in a stronger position to introduce 
considerations   other   than   trade   and   foreign   investors’   economic   interest provided 
favorable financial and political conditions. A brief discussion of amici curiae in the 
context of anti-smoking groups in Canada provided a good example of the potential and 
limits of an expansive view of amici curiae. Further investigation is needed to establish 
more precisely the extent to which public interest groups can influence NAFTA Chapter 
11 arbitration decisions under an expansive regime of amici curiae. 
